Twenty-one thousand French soldiers boarded ships in Saigon for Tonkin with the goal of reoccupying northern Vietnam, putting pressure on Ho Chi Minh to come to terms in his negotiations with France about the future of Vietnam, and gaining the release of 3, French soldiers still held prisoner in Hanoi. France completed an agreement with the Chinese government for the withdrawal of Chinese soldiers from Vietnam north of the 16th parallel.
President Truman appealing to the U. The British completed their withdrawal from Vietnam south of the 16th parallel, leaving French forces in control of the government of Cochinchina. In the morning, the French armada of 35 ships and 21, men attempted to land at Haiphong in Tonkin. Their landing was prevented by Chinese soldiers occupying the harbor who exchanged fire with the French ships. The Chinese pressured both the French and the Vietnamese to sign an agreement. In the afternoon, Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny concluded a provisional agreement.
France recognized the "Republic of Vietnam" as a "free state" within the French Union. The Vietnamese agreed to the stationing of 25, French troops for five years in Tonkin to replace the departing Chinese. France agreed to allow an election to decide whether the three regions of Vietnam would be united. Ho Chi Minh was severely criticized by other nationalists for the agreement, which offered Vietnam less than independence and that only on a provisional basis.
He reportedly said that "I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life. He was warmly received in France. General Leclerc who had departed Vietnam wrote a letter to the French ruling party stating that the war in Vietnam was practically won and that France should not concede much to the Vietnamese negotiators in Paris. Leclerq said "it would be very dangerous for the French representatives at the negotiations to let themselves be fooled by the deceptive language democracy, resistance, the new France that Ho Chi Minh and his team utilize to perfection.
The last Chinese soldiers departed northern Vietnam. The Chinese army apparently delayed its departure in order to extract as much wealth as possible from their occupation. O'Sullivan, reported "an imminent danger of an open break between the French and Viet Nam", and said "that, although the French could quickly overrun the country, they could not A report by the French authorities in southern Vietnam Cochinchina was much more pessimistic than earlier reports. In Paris, Ho Chi Minh achieved a modus vivendi in negotiations with France by which a ceasefire in southern Vietnam was to come into effect on 30 October.
France, however, did not promise independence for Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh arrived in Haiphong after an absence of more than 4 months. He had been negotiating, with little success, for Vietnamese independence with the French government in Paris. With the departure of the Chinese army in June, Giap had crushed the pro-Chinese nationalist groups in northern Vietnam, killing hundreds or thousands of their followers and, despite a cease fire, engaged the French when they attempted to expand their control out of the cities to the countryside.
The French had 75, soldiers in Vietnam, more than one-half in the north. The anti-communist leader of the French-backed government of Cochinchina, Dr. Nguyen Van Thinh, committed suicide. A cease fire was arranged. By every possible means you must take complete control of Haiphong and force the Vietnamese government and army into submission.
An estimated 6, civilians were killed. French Commissioner General d'Argenlieu in Paris informed Valluy that he approved of the bombardment. American diplomat Moffat reported to the Department of State about his visit to Hanoi. Moffat had met with Ho Chi Minh. His brief was to assure Ho of U. Ho asked for U. In the opinion of some authorities, this was a moment in which the U.
French leader Charles de Gaulle met with French High Commissioner for Indochina Thierry d'Argenlieu in France and expressed support for the Commissioner's uncompromising stance against independence for Vietnam. French negotiator Jean Sainteny was seriously wounded when a land mine blew up his car. Ho Chi Minh broadcast by radio a nationwide appeal to Vietnamese to rise up in resistance to French rule.
State Department Asian expert John Carter Vincent wrote that the French lacked the military strength to gain control of Vietnam, lacked public support in France for the war, and had a weak and divided government. He predicted that guerrilla war would continue indefinitely. Another 40, were in militia and para-military organizations. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. B; Logevall, p ; Springhall, p. New York: Random House. One Last Look Around. Duell, Sloane and Pearce. B; Logevall, p.
Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Languages Add links. In other words, there were differences in perspective between the Political Group and the Economic and Financial Group that needed to be ironed out. Members from all council planning groups attended a general meeting to discuss these issues on December 14, , still a full year before American entry into the war. While some disagreements remained after the meeting, a general consensus was reached on three key issues. Third, it was agreed that important American economic and strategic interests in Asia were being threatened by Japanese expansionism.
The conclusions concerning American interests in Asia were considered so pressing that they were embodied in a memorandum dated January 15, , under the title "American Far Eastern Policy. Using one quote from within this policy report, Shoup , p.
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The main interests of the United States in Southeast Asia were dual in nature. The first was purely economic. The memorandum stated that the "Philippine Islands, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya are prime sources of raw material very important to the United States in war and peace; control of these lands by a potentially hostile power would greatly limit our freedom of action. The second CFR concern was a strategic one that had political, economic, and psychological aspects. A Japanese takeover of Southeast Asia would impair the British war effort against Hitler, threatening sources of supply and weakening the whole British position in Asia.
It was feared that many people might view a Japanese takeover in that region as the beginning of the disintegration of the British Empire. In addition, there was concern that Australia and New Zealand might decide to focus on home defense Shoup, , p. The report therefore suggested that the United States should take the initiative by 1 giving all possible aid to China in its war with Japanese invaders, 2 building up the defenses of countries in Southeast Asia, and 3 cutting off American exports to Japan of such materials as steel armor, machine tools, copper and zinc under "the excuse of our own defense needs" CFR Memorandum E-B26, January 15, , p.
In late February , when trade sanctions already were being imposed on Japan, the State Department began its own studies of the possibilities of full economic warfare with Japan. Sixteen commodity committees were created "to determine which United States exports to Japan were essential to that country" Shoup, , p. Two reports were completed by late March and early April, and 38 additional studies by August 1. Inevitably, these studies led to the abandonment of postwar planning by the aforementioned Interdepartmental Group because the commodity studies required the services of all available government staff.
The CFR was once again left with the main planning capability on postwar issues. In early , two closely related issues dominated the planning of council leaders now that the conception of the Grand Area had been firmly established in general discussions at the end of The first was to gain the acceptance of the Grand Area strategy by both American and British decision makers.
This goal was pursued by pressing for a joint British American statement of war aims. The second issue concerned the planning of the economic and political organizations that would be needed to integrate the Grand Area; this problem led to a report on tariffs and preferences as integrating mechanisms in February and to several reports in the second half of on new international monetary, investment, and development organizations. The issue of war aims turned out to be an immensely tangled one for a variety of reasons that will be explained shortly.
The issue of economic integrating mechanisms is not central to my purpose here, so it is dealt with in great detail in the second section to show the role of CFR planners in the creation of the IMF and the World Bank. Before turning to the problem of establishing war aims, it is important to state that CFR leaders and planners began to take positions within the government in , a process that was to be intensified greatly a year later.
For example, when an Economic Defense Board headed by Vice President Henry Wallace was established on July 30, , to consider postwar economic issues, Wallace appointed economist Riefler of the Economic and Financial Group as his chief adviser. About the same time, Upgren, an economist in the same planning group, became head of the newly created National Economics Unit within the Department of Commerce. It was from this position that he performed staff functions in creating the Committee for Economic Development.
It is likely that these positions provided CFR economists with new avenues for arguing the Council perspective. At the least, they were listening posts from which more could be learned in terms of government thinking concerning postwar planning, making the government even more vulnerable to penetration by private elites. The first report from the Economic and Financial Group concerning war aims, dated April 17, , began with an analysis of what government leaders in various countries had said up to that point relating to war aims.
After characterizing the main themes, it noted that both Churchill and Roosevelt had avoided specific statements because they believed that defending freedom by defeating the Nazis was war aim enough. Rather than recommending specific war aims at the time, the report ended with several suggestions for the "tenor" of war aims.
These suggestions were based on the assumption "that the United States and Great Britain have a somewhat similar interest in a more closely integrated world economic order" CFR Memorandum E-B32, p. First, national self determination should be qualified because "a more closely integrated world economic order will almost certainly require some restrictions on sovereignty. Fourth, specific aspects of reconstruction should be discussed. Fifth, "the benefits of a world economy should be contrasted with autarchy.
Council leaders pushed their concern for a war-aims statement more vigorously at the dinner meetings held by Vice President Wallace to discuss postwar goals.
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A meeting on May 3, , was especially important because it produced a lengthy memorandum to the president. Thirteen of the nineteen people present at the dinner were connected with the CFR, including such important figures in the war peace studies as Armstrong, Bowman, Dulles, Hansen, Riefler, and Viner. A detailed history of the Atlantic Charter of August , which was the first public statement of American British war aims, treats this memorandum at great length and concludes that "It is notable that a good many of the phrases in the 'Memorandum' recur in the Atlantic Charter" Wilson, , p.
I think this overlap in language provides another type of evidence for the importance of the CFR planners within government at this point, which supplements evidence based on personal access to decision-makers and direct appointments for CFR members,. The memorandum urged a conference between the president and Churchill. It stated as a first principle that America "should and would take much more responsibility in the coming peace than in the peace which is now past" Wilson, , p.
It said the United States should claim a dominant position in the postwar world. It stressed that "it is important to come to agreements while Great Britain is willing to deal" and that there should be "an immediate opening of conversations leading to the establishment of common institutions. Finally, the memorandum suggested "a statement of our alternative to Hitler's new order," and reminded the president that "the need for a vigorous lead was repeated over and over Without outspoken leadership, we are in the position of fighting something with nothing" Wilson, , pp.
The council made a formal recommendation concerning war aims on June 22 in a document that is seen as providing important background for postwar planning by historian Alfred Eckes , pp. It began with the two functions of war aims — propaganda and the definition of the national interest — and analyzed the relationship between them:. Statements of war aims have two functions: propaganda and definition of national interests.
The latter is undoubtedly the more difficult and is of basic importance, as a failure of propagandistic and promissory war aims to correspond to the accepted view of national interests might jeopardize the entire peace settlement. Therefore, our national interest must first be defined so that promises incompatible with it may be avoided.
It is with this aspect of war aims that the present memorandum is concerned. Based on these interests, it called for postwar international anti-depression policies, new policies on monetary stabilization and investment, international commissions for special purposes, and a lowering of trade barriers. It concluded:. One clear and explicit statement must accompany any such list of American war aims: A declaration that the United States, because it recognizes that its interests are in the proper functioning of a world economy, has worldwide responsibilities, and will take part in schemes of international economic cooperation, whether involving new international institutions or only negotiations between governments and will make concessions in its own economic policy to help establish the new requirements provided, of course, that other countries will do the same.
The Political Group added a political dimension to the issue of war aims on July It said that the most important aim was "the decisive defeat of the Axis aggressors as rapidly as possible," calling for total American mobilization and full military collaboration with Great Britain, "regardless of risk. The CFR statements on war aims are also notable for what they do not emphasize as a panacea: the simple doctrine of free trade espoused by Hull.
In the April 19, memorandum, the emphasis on a world economy is coupled with a criticism of making free trade the central focus. It is doubtful if the idea of free trade now has very much appeal save to a small group of businessmen and economists. Nor is it likely that anything approaching free trade will be achieved for a long time to come. Rather, we should stress the value to all concerned of a greater interchange of goods, to be brought about in part by a removal of trade barriers and in part by positive measures of government policy.
Similarly, the report on war aims of June 22, , contained a paragraph on free trade that is even more openly critical of Hull's approach:. Old shibboleths should play no part in a statement of war aims. For instance, "free trade" sounds attractive to relatively few people and conveys an idea of reversion to the past rather than a willingness to accept a flexible approach to new problems. Such phrases also tend to paralyze the thinking of those addicted to them, by appearing as cure alls. When used, these ideas should be conjoined with other proposals indicating awareness of the new techniques required by complex difficulties.
Council planners also emphasized their criticisms of the free trade approach in published statements. Instead, CFR spokespersons saw the United States as a nation that should use its political and military power to create the international economic and political institutions necessary for the expanding world economy they believed essential for the proper functioning of the American, British, and Japanese economies. However, two problems faced council planners in trying to establish this outlook as the national interest, and it was not until that these obstacles were fully overcome.
The first was that Roosevelt did not want to go beyond general statements of objectives because he did not want arguments with allies, and in particular the British, over specific policies and institutions Dobson, , p. He also wanted to avoid arousing the strong isolationist voices in Congress who were speaking against any statements or steps that might commit the United States to join the actual fighting. The second problem was that the British wanted to delay discussions of common economic actions as long as possible with the hope they would be able to obtain better terms if the United States entered the war.
That said, persuading Roosevelt to make war aims explicit was not an insurmountable task because he already shared an internationalist vision. For him such a statement was a matter of timing, which is the rightful province of a brilliant political leader in charge of a government during a time of war. But persuading Britain was another matter. It was greatly weakened financially by American demands that it pay cash for goods from to , sell off assets in the United States to pay for goods, and limit commercial exports, which made it difficult to develop financial reserves. Great Britain thus feared it would be totally subordinated after the war by the United States, as indeed it was.
Furthermore, the British were not confident the Americans would adopt the economic policies that would be needed to prevent another world depression. Although their planners were in fairly close formal and informal contact with council planners, as demonstrated in section two of this document, there would still be the problem of dealing with Congress after the war.
There even was doubt among the British that Hull was serious about his emphasis on free trade. The American position in talks in over trade in wheat, for example, was highly discriminatory in favor of American farmers, and completely contradicted Hull's grand principles even though he claimed otherwise Dobson, , pp. It is therefore not surprising that the British-American statement on postwar economic aims in the Atlantic Charter was satisfactory to neither Hull nor the Council leaders.
The statement had an escape clause on free trade that disappointed Hull, and its lack of any statement beyond free trade and equal access to raw materials was not enough for council leaders. The upshot of several days of cagey bargaining between American and British leaders, recounted in detail in Wilson , Chapter 9 and Dobson , Chapter 3 , was a laudatory general statement of war aims that only spoke as follows on key economic issues: "They will endeavor, with due regard for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world" Wilson, , p.
CFR leaders reacted to this statement with five brief reports that analyzed its implications and suggested ways to spell out economic cooperation more fully. The fifth of these reports, formally dated January 3, , but already shared and discussed with State Department officials two months earlier, suggested a joint British-American declaration devoted to economic issues. It was similar to what State Department officials had been proposing to the British in the context of other negotiations to be discussed shortly, but it emphasized positive government measures and international collaboration as well as freer trade:.
A just and durable peace requires that governments make it their purpose to collaborate on an international basis for the promotion of full employment, increased production, higher living standards, improved labor conditions, social security, and economic stability, in their own countries and throughout the world. A In their relations with each other and with other countries, they intend to pursue appropriate and coordinated economic policies, in which all countries are invited to participate, that have as their objective the effective world wide use of the world's productive resources of men and material, to further the purposes set out above.
B In order to achieve and maintain the full and most effective world wide use of the world's productive resources of men and material, they intend to pursue within their respective countries on the basis of international collaboration, appropriate internal economic policies that have as their objective the full use of each country's domestic productive resources of men and material.
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Dissatisfaction with the Atlantic Charter as a statement of war aims also strengthened the resolve of state department officials and CFR leaders to obtain a more explicit statement of British cooperation in the context of the ongoing "lend lease" negotiations. These negotiations were an attempt to establish what "considerations" Great Britain would provide after the war in exchange for the vast amount of free war aid the United States had been providing since late March Here a brief historical reminder may be in order: A congressional bill, passed on March 11, , gave the president a free hand in deciding the nature of what future British repayment would be in exchange for the lend-lease aid of war materiel, foodstuffs, and other necessities to support the British against the Nazi attack.
In early discussions of what the considerations should be, officials in the Treasury Department thought in terms of such noncash repayments as returning undamaged military equipment and providing raw materials. When the State Department took over the negotiations in May , however, the emphasis switched to "considerations" relating to the ordering of the postwar world. The idea was to use the Lend Lease Agreement to force the British to open up their empire to the American economy and to join the United States in creating a multilateral world economy Dobson, , pp.
It was in part British resistance to these demands that led the State Department to try to use the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in August to realize its objectives. When that approach was only partially successful, the battleground returned to the Lend Lease Agreement.
Finally, in February and here I am telescoping an extremely complicated set of negotiations that will be discussed again in the second section , Roosevelt insisted on closure on the issue. Shortly thereafter, the British agreed to a statement more acceptable to the State Department. Hull later called the statement the "foundation" for "all our postwar planning in the economic field" Eckes, , p.follow site
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Council planners also were satisfied with it because it did not begin and end with free trade, and clearly incorporated some of their thinking. The key statement contained several echoes of the Council's proposed joint statement cited above:. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 14, , by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom" R.
Gardner, , pp. This statement reveals the considerable congruity between council statements and official government aims. So do other public statements, reports, and actions by government officials during concerning the national interest, which are very similar to what is found in council memorandums in On February 21, for example, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was involved in planning discussions based on war-peace documents within the state department, spoke on "World Crisis and the American Farmer" to a farm audience in Des Moines, Iowa.
He began by saying that "Future solidarity of the Americas in the interest of hemisphere defense involves economic problems of a long range character. The Western Hemisphere, as its economy is organized today, produces vast surpluses of agricultural and other extractive products which have hitherto been disposed of in markets outside the Western Hemisphere" Shoup, , p.
Although some steps could be taken to deal with these surpluses within the hemisphere, Acheson went on, the fact was that the economies of countries in the Western Hemisphere were closely related to those in other parts of the world. Because the hemisphere "does not contain the essential characteristics of a self contained economic area," it had to look elsewhere for market outlets for large surpluses of extractive products.
Above all, this hemisphere must continue to have unrestricted access to the great British markets" Shoup, , p. Lynn R. Edminister, a special assistant to Hull, gave a speech similar to Acheson's on May It follows from all this that our country should exercise leadership, in policy and action, in an endeavor to establish and maintain the largest possible sphere in the world within which trade and other economic relations can be conducted on the basis of liberal principles and of cooperation to the mutual advantage of all nations which are witting to participate.
In laying the groundwork for future international economic cooperation, it is essential that we take all possible immediate steps to assure that the largest possible grouping shall be formed as the nucleus of such cooperation. To that end the closest possible cooperation between the United States and British empire is indispensable" Shoup, , pp. Reports from the state department's Division of Research, which finally had been created in February with a three-person staff, also reflected similar postwar goals. Shoup , p. Trade barriers had to be reduced and discrimination abolished to give all countries equal access to world markets and to increase trade generally.
International monetary structures had to be set up, free from exchange controls and in such a way as to allow balancing of international payments with stable exchange rates. Also necessary were adequate facilities for international investment of capital and action to avoid depression. Another striking parallel appears in the rationale that was used in preparing for possible military action against Japan in late After Japan moved into Southeast Asia in July of that year, government leaders imposed an immediate embargo that led to lengthy and tense negotiations.
The negotiations broke down in late November because Japan would not agree to the key American demand that it evacuate Chinese territory. The three top government decision makers who functioned as the War Council, Hull, Stimson, and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, then decided that "Roosevelt should inform Congress and the American people that if Japan attacked Singapore or the East Indies the security of the United States would be endangered and war might result" Shoup, , p.
In a declaration that was preempted by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, , they stated the national interest in terms of assumptions very similar to those developed by council planners in the latter half of The first and sixth paragraphs read as follows:. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world.
To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off.
Our imports from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, all interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic Shoup, That report began with the words "It is to the interest of the United States to check a Japanese advance into southeastern Asia," and then provides the following explanation in the second paragraph:.
The Philippine Islands, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya are prime sources of raw materials very important to the United States in peace and war; control of these lands by a potentially hostile power would greatly limit our freedom of action. Toward the Philippines we have special obligations of a historical and moral nature. A Japanese occupation of the countries of southeastern Asia would further injure our interests by weakening the British war effort against Hitler, as it would threaten the chief source of supply for the war in the Near East, lead the Australians and New Zealanders to concentrate on home defenses, and would have serious psychological repercussions throughout the world particularly in Asia, since it would appear to many as the beginning of the disintegration of the British Empire.
Conversely, the frustration of Japanese plans for expansion would appear as a defeat for the totalitarian partners in the Tripartite Pact. Once the United States entered the war with a definition of the national interest that at the very least can be called consonant with the aims of the CFR, council leaders worked closely with appointed officials to intensify planning efforts inside the government and to assure that these efforts were controlled within the State Department, not some other agency or department.
On December 28, , President Roosevelt decreed "all recommendations on postwar problems of international relations from all departments and agencies of the government should be submitted to the president through the Secretary of State" Shoup, , p. On the same day, the president also approved a new 14 member Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. Council president Norman H. Davis had a large hand in its formation:. Pasvolsky, acting on directions from Secretary Hull, proposed an Advisory Committee structure, noting that this suggestion was 'the result of a recent conversation between Mr.
Norman Davis and myself, arranged in accordance with your desires in the matter. It has been read and approved by Mr. The members of the Advisory Committee came primarily from the State Department and the CFR, which is worth reporting in detail to provide evidence that the CFR and the government were as tightly linked on postwar planning as I have claimed they were.
Nine were government officials and five were private citizens chosen "because of their high personal qualifications for policy consideration and because of their capacity to represent informed public opinion and interests" Notter, , pp. Of the government officials, four were also members of the CFR or its war peace groups, including White House adviser Cohen and planner Pasvolsky. Later, in early , after the Advisory Committee faded in importance, six of the members Hull, Welles, Davis, Taylor, Bowman, and Pasvolsky took the main responsibility for political issues and became known as the Informal Political Agenda Group.
Roosevelt called them "my postwar advisers" Shoup, , p. All but Hull were members of the Council, and two, Davis and Bowman, were highly involved in the war peace studies. During and , the Advisory Committee worked primarily through a series of subcommittees.
Once again, the details on the members of these subcommittees are important in providing evidence of the close ties between the CFR and government planning at this point. Davis chaired both the Security Subcommittee and the Coordination Subcommittee, whose function was to provide "contact with private organizations actively discussing postwar problems," a vague-sounding mandate that certainly included the CFR, and thereby legitimated its role as a governmental link to the private sector Notter, , p.
Welles chaired the Political Subcommittee. When a Special Subcommittee on European Organization was created in May to consider boundary questions and region-wide organizations, Armstrong chaired it. Of the eight members of the special subcommittee drawn from other subcommittees, five were members of the CFR or its war peace groups. As for the two members of the special subcommittee from outside the already established subcommittees, they were Percy W. Although the Advisory Committee and subcommittee appointments provided a close liaison between the CFR and the State Department at the policy level, council leaders nonetheless sought similar coordination at the research level as well.
The issue was discussed at a meeting between council leaders and department officials on February 21, Early in this meeting Armstrong proposed that a decision about liaison and coordination between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Advisory Committee should be made. Welles then asked if the Advisory Committee could take over the research staff of the Council without disrupting its endeavors. Armstrong replied that the Council's labors might be seriously impaired and proposed instead that the research secretaries of the Council should work in the Department two or three days each week, attending the subcommittee meetings.
The Council would thus be in 'close relation to the actual functioning of the Advisory Committee. Due to this rather extraordinary degree of coordination, the CFR's war-peace discussion groups held their meetings early in the week, freeing the research secretaries to meet with the departmental subcommittees later in the week. This allowed the secretaries the opportunity to communicate the research needs of the department to the Council groups. They were given the title of "consultants" and received travel expenses and a per diem allowance from the government.
In my view, this combination of appointments at both the policy and research levels of the state department's postwar planning structure is powerful evidence that the Council played a major role in defining the postwar national interest. Moreover, additional evidence for the importance of these appointments arises from the fact that some regular staff members believed that the consultants were dominating the research work through prior consultation with each other and council leaders. In particular, Harley Notter, who later wrote the official departmental history of postwar planning, complained bitterly of the Council takeover in several memos to Pasvolsky in early Shoup, , pp.
Finally, in September, Notter drafted a letter of resignation stating his situation was no longer tenable for two reasons. The first was that he was receiving one set of instructions from Welles and another from Pasvolsky, which reflected a power struggle between Hull and Welles that included both personal conflicts and complex issues concerning the structure of the projected United Nations.
I have consistently opposed every move tending to give it increasing control of the research of this Division, and, though you have also consistently stated that such a policy was far from your objectives, the actual facts already visibly show that Departmental control is fast losing ground. Control by the Council has developed, in my judgment, to the point where, through Mr. Bowman's close cooperation with you, and his other methods and those of Mr. Armstrong on the Committee, which proceed unchanged in their main theme, the outcome is clear.
The moves have been so piecemeal that no one of them offered decisive objection; that is still so, but now I take my stand on the cumulative trend. Notter apparently changed his mind about resigning. The letter was never sent even though nothing changed in the relationship between the Council and the department. In his official history Notter gives no real sense of how large the Council's role was nor of his dissatisfaction with it.
Tellingly, his superficial account of postwar planning is a major source for many inadequate histories of postwar planning. In addition to the personnel evidence for CFR involvement in government decision-making, it is also possible to show that the expressions of the national interest in were similar to the perspective advocated by the CFR.
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